Florida State University Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 3

Article 6

Spring 1990

Mediation: The Florida Legislature Grants Judicial Immunity to
Court-Appointed Mediators
J. Sue Richardson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
J. S. Richardson, Mediation: The Florida Legislature Grants Judicial Immunity to Court-Appointed
Mediators, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 623 (1989) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol17/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

MEDIATION: THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE GRANTS
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO COURT-APPOINTED
MEDIATORS
J. SUE RICHARDSON

F

LORIDA is leading the way in the establishment of alternative dispute resolution procedures. As foretold by the Supreme Court of
Florida, the Legislature has attempted "to accommodate the resolution of individual disputes without the use of the judiciary in areas
where other forums or procedures can readily provide adequate dispute adjustment."' In 1987, the Florida Legislature passed comprehensive court-annexed mediation and arbitration statutes. 2 In 1989, to
ensure the participation of qualified persons as mediators and arbitrators, the Florida Legislature passed a bill granting absolute judicial
immunity to court appointed mediators and arbitrators.' While the
legislative combination of mediation and judicial immunity is a recent
phenomenon, both concepts are deeply rooted in history. This Comment examines the historical background of both concepts, but will
concentrate on how the Legislature combined the two in the 1989 statute. This foundation will provide the context for an analysis of the
Legislature's power to take such action in light of state and federal
constitutional guarantees of the right of access to the courts.
I.

BACKGROUND

Mediation is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of many
lands and cultures. 4 Recently the United States Congress revived this
ancient medium of dispute resolution by passing the Dispute Resolution Act of 1980.1 Alternative dispute resolution procedures have been
touted as the savior of a court system drowning in a flood of litigation
and as the gateway for a majority of Americans to resolve minor dis-

1.
2.
3.

Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976).
FLA. STAT. ch. 44 (1989).
Ch. 89-31, § 5, 1989 Fla. Laws 48, 50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 44.307 (1989)).

4. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION 1-7 (1984). Mediation predates litigation. Id. As
one author has noted, "Mediation may not be the oldest profession, but it surely must be
close." Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV.
731, 734 n.21 (1984) (quoting D. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 1 (1984)).
5. Dispute Resolution Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. app. II (West 1980).

624

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 17:623

putes in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. 6 "The notion that
ordinary people want black-robed judges, well dressed lawyers and
fine courtrooms as settings to resolve their disputes is not correct.
People with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they
'7
want it as quickly and as inexpensively as possible."
While mediation is of ancient lineage, its structure resists codification through rules and procedures. Part of the difficulty with establishing a clear definition is the perception that mediation is a process
which is defined by the nature of the dispute and the parties involved.'
Mediation is "a process whereby a neutral third party acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute without prescribing what
it should be. It is an informal and nonadversarial process with the
objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable
agreement." 9 Mediation is a problem-solving process which empowers
conflicting parties, who often must maintain a future relationship,' 0 to
resolve their own disputes. Mediation is short-term and interactive,
focusing on the issues in dispute, not on underlying emotional problems. 1
Mediation begins with the mediator fostering an atmosphere of confidence and trust in the process.' 2 A mediator aims to "reorient the
parties toward each other" and the problem, 3 directing them away
from their adversarial positions and allowing them to attack the problem, instead of each other. Through the use of interactive communication skills, a mediator determines the facts, isolates the contested
issues, and selects those issues that are negotiable.' 4 The mediator then
creates and explores settlement options and nudges the parties toward
a mutual agreement. In some settings, the mediator drafts the agreement and presides over its signing.

6. See, e.g., Christian, Community Dispute Resolution: First-Class Process or SecondClass Justice?, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 771, 771-72 (1986).
7. Id. at 772 (quot'ing address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association National Conference (Feb. 1982)).
8. J. FOLBERo & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 7.
9.

10.

FLA. STAT. § 44.301(1) (1989).

Chaykin, supra note 4, at 733-34.
J. FOLBERO & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 8.
12. Id. at 38-40.
13. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation:A Reply to ProfessorSusskind, 6 VT.
L. REv. 85, 91 (1981) (quoting Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. Rv.
305, 325 (1971)). See generally R. FIsHER & W. URY, GErrNo To YEs 17-40 (1981) (discussing
transition from adversarial party posturing to a problem-solving approach).
14. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 38-62; see also, Stulberg, supra note 13, at
88-94 (discussing the mediation process and its functions); Chaykin, supra note 4, at 735 (outlining a six-step process used to achieve mediators' goals).

11.
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Mediation differs from arbitration in its informal 5 and voluntary
nature.16 Arbitration is patterned on the courtroom model, 7 using
procedural rules for hearing disputes, and rendering decisions that
may be binding upon the parties. 8 "[I1n [some] important respects an
arbitrator simply is a substitute judge."' 9 A mediator, unlike an arbitrator or a judge, does not compel the parties to abide by the rules of
conduct or law as interpreted by the decisionmaker, but rather persuades them to conform to social norms of conduct they themselves
acknowledge. 20 A mediator draws on the trust of the parties rather
than on the force of law in assisting the parties to reach a mutual
agreement. 21 In light of these significant differences, should a mediator be granted the same broad immunity as judges and arbitrators?
This question recently has been addressed by authorities in the field
22
and by the Florida Legislature.
A.

Mediator Liability

There have been few claims against mediators and no reported cases
where a claimant has prevailed against one. The paucity of suits may
be due to the facts that mediation is not widely used 23 and that most
participants are satisfied with their mediation experience. 24 As the
popularity of mediation spreads, the potential for an increase in litigation against mediators by dissatisfied parties will increase. 2 Several
different legal theories for actions against mediators have been prof-

15. FLA. STAT. § 44.301(1) (1989).
16. Stulberg, supra note 13, at 88-89.
17. Chaykin, supra note 4, at 734.
18. Id.
19. Id. Chapter 682, Florida Statutes, provides for arbitration procedures similar to those
used in a judicial proceeding, including the control of the hearing, issuance of subpoenas, imposition of a decision and the existence of an appeal process. FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1989).
20. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CA. L. REv. 305, 308 (1971); see,
e.g., Roehl & Cook, Issues in Mediation: Rhetoric and Reality Revisited, 41 J.Soc. IssuEs 161,
168 (1985) (delineating three positive qualities of mediation: more flexible solutions, avoidance
of the winner-loser phenomenon, and the shift of focus away from the judge to the subject
matter of the dispute); Comment, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of
American Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1876-77 n.5 (1986) (characterizing mediators as
mere intermediaries "lack[ing] authority to dictate the substantive outcome of a dispute").
21. Chaykin, supra note 4, at 734.
22. See id. at 731-64; Comment, supra note 20, at 1876; Ch. 89-31, § 5, 1989 Fla. Laws 48,
50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 44.307 (1989)).
23. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281.
24. Id.; see also Roehl & Cook, supra note 20, at 163. Disputing parties gave mediation
high ratings for quality of settlement, fairness of process, and the role of the mediator. Studies
have shown that mediation settlements are more likely to be abided by as compared to adjudication in small claims, divorce and custody cases. Id.
25. Chaykin, supra note 4, at 732; J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281-82.
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fered, based on tort,2 6 contract, 27 and breach of fiduciary duty. 28 Each
of these legal theories, however, must surmount the difficulty of proving a breach of duty and damages before a mediator can be found
29
liable.
A tort action in the mediation context requires proof of four elements: "a duty owed to the participants by the mediator; a breach of
the duty by failure to comply with acceptable standards of practice;
damages measurable in money; and a causal relationship between the
failure to exercise an acceptable standard of practice and the alleged
damages." 3 0 One difficulty of proving these elements lies in the lack
of professional standards for mediators.3 1 Proving damages is similarly precarious, as disgruntled participants must estimate what they
would have obtained in another resolution procedure or what economic consequences were the unique result of the mediation.3 2
Contract damages rely on proof of a breach of an expressed or implied contractual duty. 3 For a mediator to be held liable under a contract theory, she would have to promise substantive results or
procedural safeguards, such as absolute confidentiality3 4 or fairness in

26. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281 (listing "fraud, false advertising,
invasion of privacy, defamation, . . . and professional negligence or malpractice"); Chaykin,
supra note 4, at 736 (arguing that the lack of clearly defined standards as to mediator duties
makes it almost impossible to establish the elements of a tort); Comment, supra note 20, at 189194 (discussing a common law tort suit in light of the difficulty of obtaining proof of proximate
cause in the mediation setting).
27. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281-83; Chaykin, supra note 4, at 737 (stating that the usual vagueness of a mediated contract limits its usefulness as a source of client
rights); Comment, supra note 20, at 1886-88 (positing a contractual model with a mediator's
duty being to ensure a procedural process that eliminates unconscionable practices and inequality
of bargaining power).
28. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281; Chaykin, supra note 4, at 738. Chaykin
suggests that the law of fiduciary duty is the most useful of the legal theories because of its
flexibility:
[I]t does not depend on the availability of a predefined legal standard, as does the law
of negligence, nor does it require a contract. Although a contract may aid in ascertaining whether a fiduciary relationship exists, fiduciary duties may be imposed where
there is no contractual agreement to abide by the duty, or even where there is a contractual provision that purports to dispense with the duty.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281-86 (discussing proof in context of contract liability and medical malpractice); Comment, supra note 20, at 1883-86.
30.

J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 283.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 285-86; see Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
causation and damages problems insurmountable).
33. J.FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 281-83.
34. Id. at 282.
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the process.35 A contract for mediation services can be crafted to
avoid either of these potential pitfalls.
The fiduciary model also poses obstacles to a successful law suit.
First, a mediator's duty must be defined. One commentator has suggested that such a definition should include the duties of being "evenhanded and unbiased, trustworthy and diligent." '3 6 It is problematic to
apply this model, which is predicated upon the professional, wellcompensated role of fiduciaries in our society (i.e., bankers, stockbrokers and realtors) 37 to mediators, who are, in most cases, uncompensated volunteers.3" Holding volunteer mediators to fiduciary
liability imposes a risk without a countervailing benefit and hence discourages the expansion of the mediation concept. 3 9 The lack of clearly
defined standards and models of professional conduct also hampers
this approach. However, difficulties are not necessarily impossibilities. Most would agree that some level of accountability is needed to
make the process reliable/ °
B.

Immunity

The Florida Legislature has granted broad immunities to court-appointed mediators. 4 ' Yet one commentator has suggested that mediators should not enjoy the same broad immunities as do arbitrators and
judges because mediators do not rely on legal precedent in imposing a
decision on the parties.4 2 As a result, this commentator concludes, mediators do not merit the "extraordinary protection from reprisal offered by formal immunities."

43

35. For a discussion of the potential effect of imposing a substantive responsibility model
on mediator liability, see Comment, supra note 20, at 1884-86. The threat of a law suit and the
misconception of the mediator's role in quasi-judicial terms of "fairness" as the guardian of
public policy, would both tend to undermine the evolution of mediation and require the mediator to distance himself from the very settlement agreement he has helped author. Id.
36. Chaykin, supra, note 4, at 749. Chaykin offers the following examples of possible
breaches: (1)advising a divorcing party that a cash settlement payment has the same tax consequences as alimony or support payments; (2) unnecessarily causing one party to feel "insecure,
undermined or guilty"; and (3) failing to inform parties to a divorce that their property may be
more valuable than they estimate. Id. at 747-48 nn.78-80.
37. Comment, supra note 20, at 1883-84; cf. Dobranski, The Arbitrator as a Fiduciary Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 Am.
U.L. REv. 65 (1982) (arguing that the creation of fiduciary status for arbitrators with its resultant liability would have a chilling effect on arbitrators' willingness to participate in arbitration).
38. Comment, supra note 20, at 1883-84.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1895.
41. Ch. 89-31, § 5, 1989 Fla. Laws 48, 50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 44.307 (1989)).
42. Chaykin, supra note 4, at 732.
43. Id. at 733.
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JudicialImmunity

Judicial immunity has been "the settled doctrine of the English
courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are
aware of, in the courts of this country. '" 44 In 1872, the United States
Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity in
Bradley v. Fisher,4 enumerating five reasons for granting absolute immunity to judges: 1) a judge must be free to act upon his own convictions without fear of personal liability; 2) the adversarial nature of the
process and the potential for great economic and emotional loss make
it likely that the loser will not only blame the judge for making a
wrong decision but also ascribe to him improper motives for doing so;
3) judges, faced with the threat of a law suit, would be driven to inefficient self-protective measures, such as excessive record-keeping; 4)
appeal and impeachment remedies provide alternative means of redress to replace the loss of action against a judge; and 5) qualified
immunity based on "good faith" would be virtually worthless in the
face of suits brought alleging "bad faith" as the judge would still
have to prepare a defense. 6 Add to this a sixth reason: judgments
47
need to be final.
Judicial immunity, however, is not absolute. The Court in Bradley
recognized a limit to this protection by stressing that when a judge
acts in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction," judicial immunity could
not be invoked. 48 Courts have broadly construed "jurisdiction,"
49
thereby rendering this limitation form without substance.
In a few limited instances, Florida courts have found a judge's actions to be outside the court's jurisdiction. In 1942, the Supreme
Court of Florida determined that court-appointed psychiatrists, who
failed to examine a woman prior to issuing a report of insanity, acted

44. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). For a thorough examination of the
historical roots of judicial immunity, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-536 (1984).
45. 80 U.S. (I Wall.) 335 (1872).
46. Id. at 347-54.
47. See Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984

(1986).
48. Bradley, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 351-52 (emphasis added).
49. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (characterizing a judge's decision as a
judicial act for which he was immune even though no "case" had been instituted); Holloway,
765 F.2d at 524 (regarding a judge, who continued to hear a case without sufficient jurisdiction
to conduct the proceedings pursuant to a court of appeal's order to desist); Gay v. Heller, 252
F.2d 313, 314 (5th Cir. 1958) (noting that "the normal way to correct errors in the trial or other
disposition of a law suit is by appeal, not by suing the judge"); McDaniel v. Harrell, 81 Fla. 66,
87 So. 631 (1921) (involving a mayor, acting in his judicial capacity, who had a storekeeper
arrested for violation of the city "blue laws" and subsequently incarcerated for refusal to pay
the fine); id. at 67, 87 So. at 632 (regarding an erroneous decision as to whether the court had
jurisdiction over the case).

1990]

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FOR MEDIA TORS

wholly without jurisdiction, as they had not obtained jurisdiction over
her person. 0 Ten years later, the supreme court held that judicial immunity did not apply to a judge who had ordered the rearrest of a
plaintiff freed on a writ of habeas corpus.5 The court reasoned that a
judge acting without jurisdiction acted without authority of law and
was no more than an "individual falsely assuming an authority he
5 2
[did] not possess.''
In a 1964 case, Waters v. Ray,53 Harold Waters appeared before
Judge Hollis Ray on a traffic violation. After a whispered conversation with the prosecutor during a recess, Judge Ray ordered Waters
arrested for not having a valid driver's license. 4 On the grounds that
the arrest charge was a nullity-no existing law required a citizen to
have a valid driver's license-the First District Court of Appeal found
that Judge Ray acted wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, without immunity.
6
The appellate court in Waters relied on Rammage v. Kendall,1
where a judge ordered the arrest of a witness who, while testifying on
behalf of the defendant, stated that he had had sexual intercourse
with the plaintiff one year earlier. The court in Rammage held that
judicial immunity did not apply to acts taken without authority. The
judge in Rammage had not obtained jurisdiction over the witness or
the subject-matter of his arrest; no charge had been filed against him
and the statute of limitations had run. 7 The court stated that to hold
otherwise "would be to deny to a citizen, absolutely, his constitutional right to have his day in court and due process of law." 5 8
The court system obtains the necessary freedom of action for its
officers through the broad grant of immunity; the system does not

50. Beckham v. Cline, 151 Fla. 481, 10 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1942).
51. Farish v. Smoot, 58 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1952).
52. Id. at 538, stating that:
[tihe reason for the rule is stated in Cooley on Torts (3d ed.), pages 805, 806, as
follows: "A judge is not such at all times and for all purposes: when he acts he must
be clothed with jurisdiction; and, acting without this, he is but the individual falsely
assuming an authority he does not possess. The officer is judge in the cases in which
the law has empowered him to act, and in respect to persons lawfully brought before
him; but he is not judge when he assumes to decide cases of a class which the law
withholds from his recognizance, or cases between persons who are not, either actually
or constructively, before him for the purpose."
Farish, 58 So. 2d at 538.
53. 167 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
54. Id. at 328.
55. Id. at 330.
56. 168 Ky. 26, 181 S.W. 631 (Ky. Ct. App. 1916).
57. Id. at 34-35, 181 S.W. at 635.
58. Id. at 32, 181 S.W. at 634.
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benefit when an officer violates a person's constitutional or statutory
rights by taking action outside the authority of his office.5 9 Determining whether a judicial officer's conduct falls within his official scope
of duty is elusive. The United States Supreme Court, seeking to provide some guidance, has stated that a judicial act is defined by the
nature of the act itself. 60 According to the Court, such an inquiry
should consider whether the act was "a function normally performed
by a judge, and ... the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they
dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. ' 61 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has appended three additional factors: whether the
act occurred within the courtroom or judge's chambers, in the context
of a case pending before the judge, and during a visit to the judge in
62
his official capacity.
The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals further clarified the role of judges in later decisions, distinguishing between administrative decisions made in the hiring and firing of employees 63 and certain other types of administrative decisions,
which were judicial in nature. 4 The Fifth Circuit implied that judges
might enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for executive and legislative functions they perform. 65 Cautioning against defining a judge's role too
narrowly, the court asserted that "ij]udges have absolute immunity
not because of their particular location within the Government but
because of the special nature of their responsibilities."6 According to
the Second Circuit,
[w]hat is meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his
power cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would
for any of the
have justified the act, if he had been using his 6power
7
purposes on whose account it was vested in him.
Courts have used this standard to determine whether an officer's acts
were discretionary and, therefore, entitled the officer to absolute im-

59. Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th
Cir. 1985).
60. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
61. Id.
62. McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-30 (1988) (finding that a judge had no immunity
against a probation officer's claim of wrongful discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
64. Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985) (administering a business, a
school district, or a prison system).
65. Id. at 525.
66. Id. at 524 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)) (stating that the occurrence of some acts outside the courtroom did not render them non-judicial).
67. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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munity. 68 Under this analysis, the United States Supreme Court has
extended absolute immunity, in the form of quasi-judicial immunity,
to a variety of governmental officers, including the President,6 9 prosecutors,70 legislators,7 legislative aides 72 and administrative officials in

73
the Department of Agriculture.
In Butz v. Economou,74 the United States Supreme Court set forth
the following two-part test for determining the need for absolute immunity: if the official's function is judicial in nature, and a disgrun-

tled party's constitutional rights are protected by safeguards built into

the regulatory framework, then the officer's conduct will be immune
from civil liability. 75 Arguably, court-appointed

mediators would

qualify for immunity under the Butz test. Even though mediators have
no decisional authority, they conduct quasi-judicial settlement hearings and are open to civil damage claims. Furthermore, the parties'
constitutional rights are protected by their power to refuse settlement

and continue with the suit. As has been explained, judicial immunity
is so broad as to be referred to as "absolute." However, as the United
States Supreme Court held in Pulliam v. Allen, 76 judicial immunity
does not insulate judges from actions brought under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 77 Allen filed a section 1983 claim for injunctive
relief against United States Magistrate Gladys Pulliam for her practice
of incarcerating individuals awaiting trial for nonincarcerable offenses. 78 The district court granted a prospective injunction against the
magistrate and awarded costs and attorney's fees according to section
1988. 79 The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision. 80
68. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 688
(5th Cir. 1985).
69. See id. (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)).
70. See id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).
71. See id. (citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)).
72. See id. (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)).
73. See id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
74. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
75. Id. at 510-13 (noting that grand jurors, prosecutors, advocates, witnesses and jurors fall
within the scope of judicial acts).
76. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
77. Id. at 541 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
78. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 525.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This section grants such costs to successful parties in section
1983 claims.
80. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 544.
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The Supreme Court reviewed section 1983 in relation to Pulliam's
claim that judicial immunity barred an award of injunctive relief under section 1983 and, therefore, an award of attorney's fees under section 1988.81 Because judicial immunity was available at common law
but injunctive relief was not, the Court turned to legislative history to
determine congressional intent.8 2 The Court found that Congress did
not intend to expand the common law doctrine of judicial immunity
to insulate judges from prospective injunctive relief under the Civil
Rights Act .8 Notwithstanding Pulliam's argument that attorney's
fees, like civil damage awards, would have an inhibiting effect on a
judge's independence of action, the Court determined that Congress
clearly intended these fees to be available in a successful section 1983
claim.
Granting mediators the same immunity enjoyed by judges is tantamount to granting them absolute immunity. As noted above, judicial
immunity is a successful defense except: where the judge acts
"wholly" outside the court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
the person; where the action taken is not "judicial"; and where prospective injunctive relief with accompanying attorney's fees are
awarded pursuant to an action brought under the Civil Rights Act.
The Florida Legislature has granted this essentially absolute immunity to court-appointed mediators. Yet the exceptions to judicial immunity described above will likely never arise in the mediation
context. Because jurisdiction is determined by the judge prior to ordering mediation8 5 and both parties or their appointed representatives
must be present for an agreement to be reached, it is highly unlikely
that a mediator can be found to have acted without jurisdiction. In
addition, the role of a mediator, though arguably not decisional in
nature, is similar to a judge's role in assisting parties to reach a settlement. In this respect, the functions of mediators are well within the
definition of judicial acts.8 6 Finally, unlike a judge, a mediator has no

81. Id. at 527.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id. at 540-41; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549 (1967). A municipal police justice
jailed civil rights demonstrators for a breach of the peace after they were arrested for attempting
to use segregated facilities in a bus terminal. The Supreme Court upheld the district court application of judicial immunity, stating that Congress had not intended to abolish the common law
right of judicial immunity under section 1983. Id. at 544.
84. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 543.
85. FLA. STAT. § 44.302 (1989) (providing for court referral of any contested civil action
filed in a circuit court over which the court has jurisdiction).
86. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing the responsibilities of judges assigned to medical malpractice mediation panels as "judicial duties"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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authority to bind the parties to their agreement; a court must approve
it.87 Therefore, injunctive relief and the accompanying attorney's fees
provision of section 1988 would be inapplicable against a mediator.
Thus, in Florida court-appointed mediators now enjoy absolute immunity for their acts.
2.

Mediator Immunity

The question of mediator immunity has been addressed statutorily
by thirteen states other than Florida and arisen in only two reported
cases. Each of the thirteen states has granted some form of immunity
to mediators. 8 These state legislatures have apparently acted in the
absence of any perceivable threat of litigation. As of this writing, only
two cases have been reported claiming civil damages for alleged injuries caused by a mediator.
In Lange v. Marshall,a9 an attorney mediated a divorce settlement
for two friends. After signing the agreement, the wife filed an action
for negligence in the attorney's representation of her interests, claiming he failed to advise her that she could get a better settlement. 9° After hiring another attorney, the wife settled out of court for a larger

87. FLA. R. Crv. P. § 1.730(c).
88. Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305 (Supp. 1988) (limiting qualified immunity to
willful or wanton misconduct); Iowa: IowA CODE § 679.13 (1987) (limiting immunity to actions
by dispute resolution center mediators made "in bad faith, with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property"); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18(2-A) (1964) and tit. 14, § 8111(1) (Supp. 1988) (providing immunity
for negligent performance of ministerial acts or discretionary functions by mediators under contract with the judicial department); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(7) (West 1988) (providing immunity for actions within the scope of farm-lender mediation panel); Mississippi: Miss.
CODE ANN. § 69-2-49 (Supp. 1988) (providing immunity for actions within the scope of the farm
debt mediation services); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-106 (1987) (providing absolute
immunity for medical malpractice mediators); New Jersey: N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23A-9(d)
(1987) (providing immunity for wrongful conduct of a dispute resolution umpire); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-539.10 to -539.11 (Supp. 1988) (limiting qualified immunity to uninsured volunteer mediators serving with uninsured non-profit charitable organizations);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(E) (West Supp. 1989) (providing immunity for
"gross negligence with malicious purpose or ... willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of any party to the mediation"); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.23 (Supp. 1988) (limiting qualified immunity to acts or omissions done or made in good faith during mediation);
Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.75.100 (Supp. 1989) (limiting qualified immunity to
dispute resolution center directors and mediators acting in good faith); Wisconsin: Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 93.50(2)(c) (West Supp. 1988) (providing immunity for any acts or omissions within the
scope of Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection mediation duties); Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 655.465(6) (West Supp. 1988) (limiting qualified immunity to medical malpractice
mediators acting in good faith); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. § 11-41-105 (Supp. 1989) (limiting qualified immunity to mediators under agricultural mediation services acting in good faith).
89. 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
90. Id. at 238.
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amount. 9' The original attorney successfully defended the suit on the
grounds that he was acting in his capacity as a mediator and was obligated to remain impartial toward both parties. 92 Even accepting the
proposition that the attorney was negligent, the Missouri Court of
Appeals held that the wife had failed to establish damages. 93
Mills v. Killebrew94 involved a due process and equal protection action under the Civil Rights Act 95 brought by winners of a forced mediation hearing. Under Michigan law, a court could submit any civil
case alleging monetary damages to mediation. 96 The mediation panel
awarded damages to the appellants, who were deemed to have accepted the award by their failure to reject it under the rules. 97 Finding
that mediators were entitled to judicial immunity because they performed a quasi-judicial function, the district court dismissed the ensuing suit. 98 The appellants argued that the use of mediation panels was
unconstitutional in Michigan, that the mediators acted without jurisdiction, and that the mediators therefore were not entitled to judicial
immunity. 99 Affirming the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals found both constitutional and statutory support for
the use of mediation panels and the grant of immunity to the mediators. o0
The mediators' role in Mills was similar to that of arbitrators because they evaluated the case and proposed an award. Under the local
rules, if one of the parties opted for a trial de novo, but did not obtain a better award, the court could impose sanctions. 10 Since this resembles Florida's court-ordered non-binding arbitration program
more than it does Florida's mediation program, 01 2 it is difficult to see
what effect, if any, this case would have in a claim against a mediator
in Florida.
Statutory and case law support quasi-judicial immunity for mediators. When a mediator acts outside the scope of his quasi-judicial duties, difficulties arise. Unlike judges, mediators have no professional
code of conduct clearly delineating their procedural and ethical duties.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 238.
765 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1985).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Mills, 765 F.2d at 70 (citing MICH. WAYNE COUNTY Cm. CT. R.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 70-71.

102.

See FLA.

STAT.

§ 44.303 (1989).

§ 403).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has not promulgated rules of conduct
for court-appointed mediators, although the court is expected to do so
by 1990. Florida courts faced with the allegation of a mediator acting
outside the scope of his judicial role have little to rely on other than
the few procedural duties expressed in the Florida Statutes and supreme court rules.
II.

PRESENT SITUATION

In recent years, the Florida Legislature and the Supreme Court of
Florida have implemented laws and corresponding rules for mediation
and other alternative dispute resolution processes. This strong commitment to alternative dispute resolution resulted in chapter 44, Florida Statutes, a comprehensive mediation and arbitration program.103
This legislation provides for court-ordered mediation for family disputes,'° 4 the establishment of citizen dispute centers, 5 court-ordered
mediation, °6 non-binding arbitration' °7 and voluntary binding arbitration for private parties. 08 In compliance with these laws, the supreme
court has promulgated rules regarding the many aspects of such alternative forms of dispute resolution and included them in the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure.1°9 The supreme court has also promulgated
corresponding rules for implementing court-ordered non-binding
arbitration 0 and voluntary binding arbitration. "
In addition to the general authorization of arbitration and mediation contained in chapter 44, Florida Statutes, the Legislature has also
authorized private contractual arbitration," 2 international contract
dispute resolution,"' consumer mediation," 4 labor law mediation,"'

103. FLA. STAT. ch. 44. (1989).
104. Id. § 44.101.
105. Id.§ 44.201.
106. Id. §44.302.
107. Id.§ 44.303.
108. Id.§ 44.304.
109. Promulgated rules include those regarding court referral of cases to mediation and arbitration, FLA. R. Crv. P. § 1.700; the conducting of mediation, id. § 1.710; mediation procedures
for sanctioning non-appearance, presence of counsel, and private caucusing with parties, id. §
1.720; the reporting of the agreement or lack thereof to the court without comment by the mediator, id. § 1.730(a); court review and approval of the agreement, id. § 1.730(c); the qualifications, training, and duties of mediators, id. §§ 1.760-1.780; and the mediation of small claims
matters, id. § 1.750.
110. Id. §§ 1.800-1.820.
111. Id.§1.830.
112. FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1989).
113. Id.ch. 684.
114. Id. § 570.544(3).
115. Id. §448.06.
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7
medical malpractice arbitration," 6 lemon law dispute resolution,"1
voluntary private condominium dispute arbitration,"' and mobile
home dispute resolution."19 Throughout the state, forty-five programs
operate under this legislation: twenty county citizen dispute and small
claims programs, eleven circuit court family mediation programs, and
fourteen circuit court non-family dispute programs.120
Until the 1989 session, the Legislature had granted immunity to mediators and arbitrators in only two specific instances-qualified immunity to mediators in citizen dispute centers 2' and immunity to
arbitrators in international arbitration cases.' 22 The contemporaneous
Senate Staff Analysis of the bill proposing absolute immunity for mediators pointed out that there existed no Florida case law determining
whether mediators should be afforded quasi-judicial status and the
absolute immunity which accompanies it. '2 Moreover, a first draft of
the Senate Staff Analysis stated that "[t]here have been instances in
Florida, and other jurisdictions, in which arbitrators and mediators
... have been sued by unhappy litigants.' ' 24 The 1989 Annual Report
prepared by the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee at the direction of
the Senate President recommended the extension of absolute immunity to arbitrators and mediators in their roles as quasi-judicial officers to prevent harassment from suits brought by disappointed
litigants. 2 The report concluded that existing laws and rules pertaining to arbitration and mediation provided sufficient safeguards to

116. Id.§ 766.207.
117. Id. § 681.108.
118. Id. § 718.112(2).
119. Id. § 723.037(4).
120. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., HB 884 (1989) Staff Analysis 1 (rev. April
18, 1989) (final draft on file with committee).
The following circuits/counties have established court-annexed mediation programs: 1st Circuit/Escambia and Okaloosa Counties; 2d Circuit/Leon County; I th Circuit/Dade County;
13th Circuit/Hillsborough County; 17th Circuit/Broward County; 18th Circuit/Brevard County;
and 20th Circuit/Charlotte, Lee and Collier Counties. J. STULBERO, COUNTY COURT MEDIATION:
A MEDIATOR'S MANUAL 4 (May, 1989) [hereinafter A MEDIATOR'S MANUAL] (available at Dispute
Resolution Center, Florida State University College of Law).
121. FLA. STAT. § 44.201(6) (1989) (providing qualified immunity for any acts or omissions
in the scope of employment unless made in "bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another").
122. Id. § 684.35.
123. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., CS for SB 155 (1989) Staff Analysis 4 (rev.
April 4, 1989) [hereinafter Judiciary-Civ. Comm. SB 155 Staff Analysis] (on file with committee).
124. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., SB 237 (1989) Staff Analysis 1 (Feb. 17,
1989) (on file with committee).
125. STAFF OF FLA. S. COM. ON JtrDicARY-Crv., ANNUAL REPORT, 82-83 (Mar. 23, 1989)
(on file with committee).
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protect participants from unlawful conduct by mediators and arbitra26
tors. 1
III.

LEGISLATION

The comprehensiveness of its legislation has thrust Florida to the
forefront of court-annexed dispute resolution programs.' 27 Florida's
first Citizen Dispute Settlement Center opened in Dade County in
28
1975, followed by the first mediation program in Broward County.
Touted as a growth industry, mediation is expected to ease court congestion caused by the state's rapid population growth. The Family
Law Section of the Florida Bar originally proposed the bill affording
mediators judicial immunity. 129 The Mediation and Arbitration Committee of the Supreme Court of Florida recommended the extension
of absolute judicial immunity to mediators and arbitrators in its 1987
report accompanying the proposed rules for implementing chapter 44,
30

Florida Statutes. 1

With this encouragement, Senator Helen Gordon Davis 13' and Representative James Davis 3 2 introduced bills granting mediators and arbitrators judicial immunity. The initial versions of both bills remained
relatively unaltered through sub-committee, committee and full floor
readings.'
The Senate Committee on Judiciary-Civil received no

126. Id. at 83.
127. A MEDIATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 120, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Judiciary-Civ. Comm. SB 155 Staff Analysis, supra note 123, at 3.
130. Id.
131. Dem., Tampa.
132. Dem., Tampa.
133. Senate Bill 237 replaced Senate Bill 155 in full committee. Senator Davis stated that the
immunity provision in Senate Bill 237 was not "inconsistent" with Senate Bill 155 and recommended the substitution, which was adopted by the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee. Fla. S.
Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 4, 1989) (statements of Sen. Helen Davis) (tape on file with committee).
Senate Bill 237 in all forms reads: "An arbitrator appointed pursuant to s. 44.303 or s. 44.304
or a mediator appointed pursuant to s. 44.302 shall have judicial immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a judge." Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., SB 237 § 5 (1989) (Second
Engrossed and Enrolled versions).
The initial version of House Bill 884 proposed extending immunity to all persons covered by
sections 44.101-.306, Florida Statutes (1989). Fla. H. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., HB 884 § 1
(Apr. 5, 1989). This proposal would have granted unqualified judicial immunity to participants
in citizen dispute centers, who presently enjoy a lesser, qualified immunity under section
44.201(6), Florida Statutes (1989). Fla. H. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., Subcomm. on Court Systems, Probate and Consumer Law, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 5, 1989) (nature of "unqualified" immunity for court-appointed mediators and arbitrators discussed) (on file with
committee). This provision was amended and citizen dispute center participants deleted in the
version presented to the full committee on April 12, 1989. Fla. H. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ.,
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questions on the immunity provision of Senate Bill 237, 3 4 nor was
there discussion on the Senate floor when the bill was presented and
passed unanimously by the thirty-six senators present. '
The House Subcommittee on Court Systems, Probate and Consumer Law discussed the meaning of "unqualified" immunity in
House Bill 884. 36 Laurel Landry, Assistant Director of Governmental
Affairs for The Florida Bar, responded that unqualified immunity
was needed to encourage participation in court-annexed programs.117
She stated that qualified immunity would permit mediators and arbitrators to be sued and would have a corresponding chilling effect on
the willingness of qualified persons to fill those roles.'38 Representative Robert Harding' 39 expressed concern about extending absolute immunity to non-lawyer mediators, who are not required to pass the
stringent qualification standards set forth by The Florida Bar for attorneys participating in citizen dispute programs.'40
Ms. Landry responded that, even though some mediators are not
attorneys, the supreme court ensures their qualification to serve by
requiring specific training for all court-appointed mediators and arbitrators.'41 She stated that the grant of judicial immunity serves the following purposes: officially recognizing the mediators' judicial
function in facilitating settlements; extending the quasi-judicial immunity already granted to them by case law; encouraging qualified volunteers; and alleviating the pressures on the judicial system.14 2 Following
this discussion, the committee voted unanimously in favor of the
bill. ,41

tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 12, 1989) (on file with clerk) (discussion of immunity for
citizen dispute and court-appointed participants).
The final draft of section 1, House Bill 884 as amended, reads: "Mediators and arbitrators
appointed pursuant to ss. 44.302-44.303 shall enjoy judicial immunity in the same manner and to
the same extent as full-time judicial officers." Fla. H. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., HB 884 § 1
(1989) (as reported to clerk).
134. Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 4, 1989) (tape on
file with committee).
135. FLA. S. JOURN. 392, 393 (Reg. Sess. May 18, 1989).
136. Fla. H. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., Subcomm. on Court Systems, Probate and Consumer Law, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 18, 1989) (Laurel Landry, Assistant Director,
Governmental Affairs, The Florida Bar, responding) (tape on file with committee).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The vote was 18-0.
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On May 10, 1989, the House, without discussion, unanimously
passed Senate Bill 237.144 The final version as passed reads: "An arbitrator appointed pursuant to s. 44.303 or s. 44.304 or a mediator appointed pursuant to s. 44.302 shall have judicial immunity in the same
' 145
manner and to the same extent as a judge.'
147
In separate interviews, Senator Davis' 1" and Representative Davis
both indicated that their purpose in sponsoring the legislation was to
attract qualified people to participate in the court-annexed arbitration
and mediation programs voluntarily or for a nominal consideration.
Representative Davis stated that the quality control function of the
supreme court's mandatory training program would safeguard the
public from improper actions by court-appointed participants.' 4 8 Even
though the supreme court has not yet promulgated standards of ethical conduct to complement the broad immunity provision, Representative Davis noted that the court planned to do so by the bill's
49
January 1, 1990 effective date.1
The question of whether the safeguards inherent in the mediation
process are adequate was addressed by W. Kent Brown in a memoran1 Brown
dum reviewed by the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee. 50
noted that the voluntariness of the agreement and the requirement of
court approval serve as built-in safeguards of fairness.' 5 ' As a practical matter, however, he cautioned that an unfair result could occur if
a mediator coerced an unwitting party to acquiesce in an agreement
and a court rubber-stamped it.152 Concluding that court-ordered medi144. FLA. H.R. JouRN. 449 (Reg. Sess. 1989). The vote was 110-0.
145. Ch. 89-31, § 5, 1989 Fla. Laws 48, 50 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 44.307 (1989)).
146. Telephone interview with Sen. Davis (May 23, 1989) (discussing legislative intent of SB
237) (notes available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla.
State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
147. Interview with Rep. Davis (May 23, 1989) (discussing legislative intent of HB 884) (tape
recording available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla.
State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Judiciary-Civ. Comm. SB 155 Staff Analysis, supra note 123, at 3 (citing Brown, Statutory Immunity for Court-OrderedMediators and Arbitrators,Florida Dispute Resolution Center
(Mar. 30, 1989) at 2-3) (on file with committee).
151. Brown, Statutory Immunity for Court-OrderedMediatorsand Arbitrators, Florida Dispute Resolution Center (Mar. 30, 1989) at 2-3.
152. Id. The role of a mediator as a fairness monitor versus an impartial intermediary has
been much debated. See Susskind, EnvironmentalMediation and the Accountability Problem, 6
VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). But see Stulberg, supra note 13.
Commentatorshave argued that women, who only recently have made gains in obtaining legal
protection of their rights in matters of child and spousal support, property settlement and as
victims of spouse abuse, will lose those dearly won rights if forced to reprivatize their divorce
proceedings in mediation. Lefcourt, National Center on Women & Family Law, 18 NAT'L
CLAEAINGHOUSE REv. 266 (1984); Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985).
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ation did not provide adequate safeguards to justify abolishing an injured party's right of action against an unethical mediator, Brown
recommended the promulgation of ethical standards of conduct by the
supreme court and the establishment of a regulatory board to enforce
them.153 This would "parallel the judicial process whereby judges,
54
though protected by immunity, are subject to a regulatory board."'
Neither of these proposed safeguards were addressed by the Florida
Legislature.' 55
As the law now stands, mediators and arbitrators in court-annexed
programs will have absolute immunity beginning in 1990. Parties to
mediation and arbitration will have correspondingly inadequate safeguards to protect their rights and to ensure that trained mediators will
be disciplined for nonexistent ethical code violations. The concern for
obtaining qualified mediators and arbitrators was clearly expressed,
but was unsupported by empirical evidence. A report from a retired
Palm Beach judge 5 6 and a newspaper article 5 7 formed the basis of
legislative concern. The article chronicled a law suit by an inmate,
who was a party to a county court mediation settlement, against a
volunteer mediator for not ensuring that his settlement check was issued in time to meet his deadline for repayment of a personal debt.' 58
The mediator spoke of resigning from the program, as the cost of defending himself was too much to pay for volunteering his services. 519
The Legislature's well-intentioned desire to support Florida's
emerging dispute resolution programs may have led to a hasty decision. Only time and pragmatic testing of mediator immunity in the
courts will provide the answer.

153. Brown, supra note 151, at 8-9. The purpose of setting standards is to educate mediators
and consumers on the role and function of mediators, as well as to aid in creating uniformity in
mediation practice. See Bishop, Mediation Standards: An Ethical Safety Net, 4 MEDIATION Q. 5
(1981); see also Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz.
L. REv. 329 (1984) (proposing new standards that go beyond the adversarial model codified by
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility); Comment, The
Mediator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law and One Argument for Professional
Responsibility Guidance-A Proposal for Some Ethical Considerations, 34 UCLA L. REv. 507
(1986) (proposing ethical goals for the attorney/mediator consistent with a non-adversarial function).
154. Brown, supra note 151, at 9.
155. Neither the tape recordings of committee and floor discussions nor the staff reports of
the House and Senate bills contain any mention of Mr. Brown's concern.
156. Ratliff, Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Mediators and Arbitrators (memorandum prepared for Judge Silverman) (Oct. 19, 1988) (on file with S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ.).
157. No More Mr. Nice Guy, Miami Herald, June 20, 1987, at 2PB, col. 1.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

If a challenge to the Legislature's grant of absolute immunity to
mediators arises, it will most likely be predicated on article I, section
21 of the Florida Constitution, which guarantees an injured party access to the courts. This provision, provides: "The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."'60 This provision first appeared in
similar form in the Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights in

1838. 161
A. Equal Protection and Due Process Challenges
The right of access to the courts, while not expressly guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, has been found to exist in the first
amendment's "petition for redress of grievances" provision, the fifth
and fourteenth amendments' "due process of law" clauses, the sixth
amendment's "right to a speedy and public trial" guarantee, the fourteenth amendment's "privileges and immunities" provision, and in
the fourteenth amendment's "equal protection" clause. 162 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection to mean that all persons "should have
like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their per163
sons and property, [and] the prevention and redress of wrongs."
Florida courts have recognized the limitations the equal protection
and substantive due process guarantees place on a state's police
power. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that "[a]ny statute
enacted as an exercise of sovereign police power should, at a minimum, further a broad 'public' interest."' 64 The exercise of police
power1 61 must apply to the general public and not favor a particular

160.
161.
(1977).
162.
163.

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
Note, Article I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 871, 872
Id. at 871-72.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (prohibiting legislation that discriminates

against one class in favor of another). For a discussion of how Florida courts have applied equal
protection clause decisions to their interpretations of the access-to-courts guarantee, see Spence
& Roth, Closing the CourthouseDoor: Florida'sSpurious Claims Statute, 11 STETSON L. REV.
283, 293-99 (1982).
164. United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Bevis, 336 So. 2d 560, 564 (Fla. 1976).
165. The supreme court offered the following definition:

Police power has been defined as an exercise of the sovereign right of the state to
enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare
of the people .... The police power includes anything which is reasonable, necessary,
and appropriate to secure the peace, order, protection, safety, good health, comfort,
quiet, morals, welfare, prosperity, convenience, and best interest of the public.
Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 942 (Fla. 1985), quashed by City of North Bay Village v.
Braelow, 498 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1986).
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class;166 it must be impartial and nondiscriminatory.1 67 "Any form of
state legislation creating discriminatory classifications (1) that concern
fundamental constitutional rights, 68 or (2) whose defining criteria are
inherently suspect, 69 or (3) that are unnecessarily restrictive and unreasonably related to the legislation's purported purpose, 70 is subject
to challenge and examination as a denial of equal protection of the
laws."' 7 An equal protection challenge is often intertwined with a
substantive due process challenge, which is based on the legislature's
use of its police power to unjustifiably intrude upon an individual's
72
fundamental rights. 1
As long as a state does not infringe upon a constitutional right or
contravene a federal statute, it has great latitude to regulate the conduct of its citizens. 73 For a regulation to be constitutional, the state
must show that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 174 However, when a statute supported by a legitimate state
purpose conflicts with a constitutional right, the court must employ a
due process balancing test and require the state to show a compelling
interest. 75 An individual's exercise of fundamental rights outweighs
76
any legitimate state interest that is not compelling.
A state's interest in stemming the "floodtide of litigation" and assisting the courts in operating more efficiently is not sufficiently compelling to justify the denial of an individual's fundamental right to

166. Bevis, 336 So. 2d at 564 (citing Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40
So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949)).
167. Id.
168. Federal law, by implication, recognizes a right of access to courts as fundamental. See
Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. Rav. 223, 249-56 (1970).
169. See Wiggins v. City of Jacksonville, 311 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (finding
that a Jacksonville ordinance, which granted licenses to plumbers meeting city standards but
refused licenses to plumbers meeting the identical standards of nearby Atlantic Beach, violated
state and federal equal protection clauses).
170. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 167-76 (1971) (finding that denial
of right to illegitimate children, but not legitimate children, to recover under survival death benefits afforded by workmen's compensation laws is unconstitutional); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, 308-11 (1966) (finding that requirement, which obligated incarcerated parties, but not others, to repay the cost of producing transcripts used in an unsuccessful appeal, is violative of 14th
amendment).
171. Patch Enters. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (citing Craig v.
Boron, 429 U.S. 190, 210 & n.* (1977)) (holding that prohibition of alcoholic consumption at
both bottle clubs and liquor retail establishments during certain hours was constitutional exercise
of county's police power).
172. Id. at 1080.
173. Id.(citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975)).
174. Id. at 1081.
175. Goodpaster, supra note 168, at 244.
176. Id.at 244-45.
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seek access to the courts.177 Noting the increase in the number of cases
being filed, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan has asserted that
"a solution that shuts the courthouse door in the face of the litigant
with a legitimate claim for relief ... seems to be not only the wrong
'
tool but also a dangerous tool for solving the problem." 178
This balancing test can be applied to a situation where a party is
injured by a negligent act of a court-appointed mediator, who, pursuant to section 44.307, Florida Statutes, is immune from suit. Under
the equal protection analysis, the state may assert the public interest
of protecting mediators from the chilling effect of the threat of litigation. Arguably, this legislative action is impartial and generally applicable, as it does not create a discriminatory classification.
Applying the due process analysis, one can argue that granting absolute immunity to court-appointed mediators conflicts with the exercise of a state citizen's constitutional right of access to the courts. The
Legislature's dual purposes of recruiting volunteers and easing the
caseload of the courts may not be sufficiently compelling to justify
denial of a constitutional right. On the other hand, the purported
chilling effect of threatened law suits against volunteer mediators may
justify the grant of immunity. Empirical evidence should be required,
however, to show that a chilling effect actually exists.
B.

State ConstitutionalChallenges

A challenge to statutory immunity for mediators may also be predicated upon the access-to-courts guarantee of the state constitution. In
177. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Other interests that may
be proffered by the state as compelling-"the discouragement of frivolous, malicious, or harassing litigations; fairness to opponents; the protection of existing interests, and economy for the
state"-are considered insufficient when balanced against a constitutional right. Note, supra
note 161, at 904-05 n.216.
178. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAiv. L.
REv. 489, 491 (1977). Florida courts have applied the United States Supreme Court analysis of
the equal protection clause and substantive due process clause to cases alleging article I, section
21 violations. The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978), held
chapter 77-468, section 42(5), Florida Statutes, unconstitutional on the grounds that it arbitrarily
took fines paid by traffic violators and paid them to a restricted class of private individuals
designated by law as "good drivers." Id. at 278 (citing ch. 77-468, § 42(5), 1977 Fla. Laws 2057,
2087-88). The court stated that the statute created an irrational classification. Id.
In Quicker v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 354 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the city's application of age provisions in initial and subsequent
pension plans arbitrarily and irrationally discriminated against certain employees. Id. at 403. The
initial pension plan only covered employees under the age of fifty-four years and six months.
The replacement plan had no age restrictions, but covered only future employees and those who
were covered under the prior plan. Id. at 402. This meant that employees, like Mr. Quicker, who
were ineligible under the initial plan's age limit, were also ineligible under the new plan. Id. A
fifty-five year old new employee, on the other hand, would be eligible. Id. The court found no
rational basis for retaining the age restriction. Id.at 403.
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Kluger v. White, 79 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue
of legislative modification or abolishment of common law remedies in
relation to the Florida Constitution's guarantee of access to the
courts.' 80 The court weighed the state's purpose of enacting legislation
to meet society's changing needs against the protection of an individual's fundamental rights. 8 ' The court held that where a right of access to the courts has been provided by a statute predating the
adoption of Florida's Declaration of Rights in 1968, or where such
right has become a part of the common law, 8 2 the Legislature may
not abolish such right without providing an adequate alternative to
protect those rights, unless an overpowering public necessity exists
which no available alternative method can meet. 8 3 Under this criterion, the courts have held that granting immunity to administrative
agencies established after 1968 is a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power.'8 4
Courts have found the following to be adequate alternative remedies: worker compensation laws replacing a common law cause of action against a negligent employer with a statutory remedy;'85 a
mandatory medical malpractice law requiring a claimant to submit his

179. 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
180. Id. Section 627.738, Florida Statutes, abolished tort actions for automobile accidents
where property damage suffered did not exceed $550. Id. Kluger was involved in an automobile
accident with damages of $250 (less than the statutorily mandated $550). Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 23. The Supreme Court of Florida found that the legislation was an unconstitutional abolition of
Kluger's fundamental right of access to the courts to seek redress for an existing common law
tort. Id. at 5. The court also found no overwhelming public necessity to justify the Legislature's
abolition of this right. Id. The court reasoned that the alternative remedy-the option to purchase collision insurance or act as one's own insurer-was not an adequate substitute for the
right to sue in tort. Id.
For an analysis of the Kluger decision, see Comment, Insurance-No-FaultAutomobile Property Protection-Legislature'sAbrogation of Common Law Tort Right to Recover Property
Damage of Less Than $550 Violates Florida Constitution, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 178 (1974);
Comment, Insurance: Does Florida'sNo Fault Law Comply with the ConstitutionalRight of
Access to Courts? 35 U. FiA. L. REV. 194 (1983).
181. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 5.
182. An alternative remedy must be provided only for actions provided by statutory or common law predating the 1968 adoption of the state constitution. See Harrell v. State, Dept. of
Health and Rehab. Servs., 361 So. 2d 715, 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
183. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, provides for the adoption of the
common laws of England as part of the state statutory law predating the 1968 adoption of the
Declaration of Rights. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1989).
184. Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n v. Palm Beach County Bd., 429 So. 2d 1260, 1267 (Fla.
1st DCA) (holding that existing development of regional impact review process predating the
adoption of the Declaration of Rights poses no access to courts problem), review denied, 438 So.
2d 831 (Fla. 1983); Fernandez v. Florida Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 383 So. 2d 974, 976 (Fla. 3d
DCA) (holding that curtailing actions against legislatively created agencies is a permissible legislative act), review denied, 389 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1980).
185. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
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case to a mediation panel before court review; 86 and no-fault automobile insurance legislation. 8 7 The Supreme Court of Florida has listed
typical examples of reasonable restrictions to include statutes of limitation and repose, 8' payment of reasonable cost deposits, 189 conversion of an action against a private individual into an action against a
state agency,'90 and the suspension of libel actions against newspapers
until they have exercised their right of retraction. 9'
Courts also have leniently interpreted the "overpowering public necessity" requirement set forth in Kluger. Examples of actions abolished by the Legislature under this power are claims based on
alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach
of promise to marry. 192 The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the legislative abolishment of these actions based on the Legislature's plenary power to regulate the marriage relationship from which these
actions arose. 93
More recently, courts have construed the Legislature's legitimate exercise of its police power, based on a clearly stated legislative finding
of public necessity, to include the enactment of statutes of repose on
claims against architects and contractors for negligent design 94 and on
medical malpractice claims based on a legislative finding of a medical
malpractice insurance crisis in the state. 95 However, the supreme
court found the legislatively imposed cap on noneconomic damages
under section 59 of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act, 96 unjustified
under the state's police power. 97 The court concluded that restricting
a claimant who had received a $1,000,000 jury verdict to $450,000 was
an arbitrary, unconstitutional abolition of his right of redress of inju-

186. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976).
187. See Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12, 17 (Fla. 1982) (providing a reasonable alternative to a tort action by guaranteeing injured party prompt payment for most expenses, albeit not
full expenses).
188. See Carr v. Broward, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989).
189. See Carter,335 So. 2d at 805.
190. See White v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 448 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA), appeal
dismissed, 443 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1983); see also Perl v. Omni Int'l of Miami, Ltd., 439 So. 2d
316, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (holding that making all communication in unemployment compensation hearing absolutely privileged did not abolish common law cause of action for defamation).
191. Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805.
192. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 1948).
193. Id. at 421.
194. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Conyers, 491 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA
1986).
195. Carr v. Broward, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989).
196. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986).
197. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 1987).

646

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 17:623

ries.' 98 The court stated that if the Legislature could bypass the requirements of Kluger, then the constitutional right of redress for
injuries "would be subordinated to, and a creature of, legislative

grace or.

.

.

'majoritarian whim.'

199

Applying the Kluger test to the statutory immunity granted to
court-appointed mediators, one could argue that the Legislature has
clearly abolished a mediatrant's right of redress for an action based
on tort, contract or fiduciary theories without providing an alternative
remedy. Two responses may be made to this challenge. First, because
court-annexed mediation programs were enacted after the 1968 adoption of the Declaration of Rights, the Legislature did not abolish a
pre-existing right. Second, the Legislature has met the "overpowering
public necessity" requirement of Kluger, as the stated purpose of the
immunity provision is to recruit and retain qualified mediators who
would not participate without liability protection.
However, in addition to demonstrating a valid public policy argument, Kluger requires that no alternative remedy be available to protect the foreclosed right. The Legislature might have established a
compensation trust fund for injured parties; it might have provided
malpractice insurance for court-appointed mediators; or it could have
postponed the enactment of the legislation until the supreme court
had promulgated an ethical code of professional conduct for mediators and established a regulatory board to enforce the code as a means
of protecting a mediatrant's right of redress. The Legislature considered none of these actions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mediation is an ancient form of dispute resolution common to a
wide variety of cultures. Faced with ever-increasing judicial case loads
and a public demand for speedier, more flexible means of resolving
private conflicts, Congress and states such as Florida have implemented court-annexed mediation programs. Many of these programs
are patterned on a citizen dispute center model, relying on volunteer
or nominally paid mediators.
In an effort to recruit and retain qualified participants for Florida's
program, the 1989 Legislature passed a measure providing absolute
judicial immunity to court-appointed mediators. Federal case law supports judicial immunity for quasi-judicial officers performing judicial
functions when adequate safeguards exist to protect a person's consti-

198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 1089.
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tutional rights. The legislative staff analysis, prepared in response to
the proposal of absolute immunity for mediators, indicates that a mediator performs a quasi-judicial function and that the threat of a law
suit from disappointed parties supports the need for immunity; it also
suggests that the built-in safeguards of the parties' retaining final decisional authority over their agreement coupled with judicial review and
approval of mediated agreements are sufficient protection of a mediatrant's constitutional rights.
The Legislature considered very little empirical evidence supporting
the assertion that the possibility of being sued was discouraging mediators from participating in court-annexed programs. In addition,
the Legislature's reliance on safeguards built into mediation may be
misplaced. A code of professional ethics enforced by a regulatory
board with appropriate powers is needed. These measures would provide safeguards analogous to the judicial code of ethics and disciplinary procedures already in place for judges.
The effect of this legislation is to abolish a mediatrant's constitutional right of access to the courts without providing an alternative
remedy. Under the Kluger analysis, this abolition is permissible only
where the cause of action was created after the adoption of the Declaration of Rights in 1968, or where an overwhelming public purpose
exists and no alternative remedy is available to protect the citizen's
right of redress for personal injury. Because Florida's court-annexed
mediation programs were legislatively established in 1987, the exception to the Kluger rule operates to empower the Legislature's action.
Arguably, the Legislature has the obligation to provide an alternative
means of redress, such as a personal injury trust fund or liability insurance for court-annexed programs. Additionally, the supreme court
is statutorily obligated to promulgate disciplinary rules and procedures.
In its haste to support Florida's fledgling mediation program, the
Legislature has granted broad protections to one class-court-appointed mediators-and completely ignored the protections of another-the parties to mediation. The Legislature should rectify this
imbalance by adopting adequate safeguards.

